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Policy Brief
Leaving an Emissions Trading
Scheme: Implications for the United
Kingdom and the European Union
Richard S. J. Tol*
Introduction
The history of emissions trading systems is generally one of expansion over time, increasing
the coverage of emitters and adding new regions or countries. There is extensive literature
that addresses the key issues and offers guidance to policymakers as they consider initiating or
expanding emissions trading programs and policies (World Bank 2016). There is, however,
no guidance concerning whether and how to depart from an emissions trading scheme (ETS).
This is the issue currently facing the United Kingdom (UK), which has decided to termi-
nate its membership in the European Union (EU)—commonly referred to as Brexit. As a
member of the EU, the UK is also a member of the EU ETS for greenhouse gases, but Brexit
may end the UK’s participation in the EU ETS. Although this “ETSexit” clearly poses chal-
lenges for the EU, the challenges are even larger for the UK because it will have to develop a
policy to reregulate emissions.
The EU ETS is the world’s largest market for emission permits, covering some 45% of EU
greenhouse gas emissions from 11,000 installations.1 It is currently in its third phase, which
runs from January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2020. Emission permits are valid for the entire
phase and surpluses can be carried forward (i.e., beyond 2020).2 This multiyear emission
budget complicates ETSexit. The simplest option would be for the UK to leave the EU in 2021,
which reduces transaction costs. If the UK chooses this option, then the third phase of the EU
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Jo Barrett, Frank Convery, Suzanne Leonard, Iain Turner, Alan Winters and an anonymous referee provided
excellent comments on previous versions of this article.
1See https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en.
2This intertemporal fungibility is important because energy use and, thus carbon dioxide emissions, vary
unpredictably with the weather, the business cycle, etc. Moreover, emissions for individual companies vary
from year to year for a host of additional reasons. Multiyear permits make hedging much easier, thus
reducing the costs of compliance.
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ETS would conclude with the UK as a member and the fourth phase would start without it.
Although the EU would have to adjust its preparations for the fourth phase, that is about it.
However, if the UK rejects the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which
means ETSexit would occur on March 30, 2019, then the situation becomes much more
complicated and costly for both the UK and the EU.
When the UK leaves the EU, it will also automatically leave the ETS. Some non-EU
countries are members of the EU ETS (i.e., Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein). Thus, in theory,
the UK could immediately rejoin the EU ETS. However, in order to completely withdraw
from the jurisdiction of the ECJ, which, at the time of this writing, is the wish of Prime
Minister Teresa May, the UK could not rejoin the ETS. The departments in the UK that are
responsible for climate policy—Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and
Environment, Food and Rural Areas (DEFRA)—have yet to take a position on ETSexit,
and the UK Committee for Climate Change, the official advisory body, has yet to recommend
a course of action. A parliamentary committee has argued against ETSexit before 2021 (i.e.,
before the end of the current phase of the EU ETS) to avoid unnecessary disruption3 and has
argued for rejoining the EU ETS if it is reformed to increase the permit price (BEISComm
2017). However, British politics is currently volatile and chaotic, and it is certainly possible
that the UK will exit the EU ETS in March 2019.
Given the complexity of the issues faced by the UK and the EU concerning Brexit, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to assign probabilities to outcomes. The purpose of this policy
brief is to examine the climate policy options for both the UK and the EU in light of ETSexit,
to consider the economic and environmental implications of ETSexit, and to provide some
policy guidance. In the next section, I discuss the implications of ETSexit for the EU. Then I
examine the implications for the UK. In the final section, I discuss policy options and
recommendations.
Implications of ETSexit for the EU
ETSexit would have the following implications for the EU:
Decreased Emission Permits and Increased Distributional Concerns
If the UK leaves the EU ETS, the overall number of emission permits in the ETS will have to be
adjusted downwards to reflect the UK’s share of permits. In principle, this is not complicated
because permits are issued and auctioned at regular intervals. The UK’s projected emission
allocation for 2020 is approximately 140 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e)
(EEA 2015). This is small relative to the 900 million allowances that were taken out of the 2014
to 2016 EU ETS auctions and added to the 2019 to 2020 auctions.4 However, these previous
attempts to adjust the volume of permits5 exposed the fragile compromise underlying EU
3The government may agree. See http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-
answers-statements/written-question/Lords/2017-10-19/HL2265/.
4See https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform_en.
5This was in response to persistently low permit prices, which were due to either overallocation of permits or
rather lackluster economic growth (Bel and Joseph 2015).
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climate policy, which reflects the different political priorities in eastern, western and southern
Europe (Chaton, Creti, and Peluchon 2015; Grüll and Taschini 2011). In addition to their
national allocations, poorer countries receive 10% of all auctioned permits.6 If the UK leaves
the EU ETS, the number of auctioned permits will fall, which will shrink this redistribution.
Although the amounts are small (e100–e150 million), this will reopen a contentious debate
about distributional issues within the EU.
A Decrease in Permit Prices
The UK’s share of EU emissions is projected to fall from 11.8 percent in 2015 to 8.2 to 8.4
percent in 2020.7 ETSexit will result in the loss of the UK demand for EU ETS permits, which
will lead to a downward shock to emission permit prices.
In the four weeks leading up to June 23, 2016 (the date of the Brexit referendum), the
average permit price at auction was e5.86 per tonne of CO2. In the four weeks after the
referendum, the price fell to e4.67 per tonne of CO2, a price drop of 20 percent.
8 Besides the
expected reduction in UK demand for permits, the price drop was likely also influenced by an
expected slowdown of economic growth across Europe and the departure of one of the EU’s
environmental champions (Curtin 2017). Price volatility may increase in the run-up to
ETSexit, as UK companies sell the permits they banked for the final years of the budget
period and unwind their hedges.
Monitoring of Emissions and Permits
The UK has been a net importer of permits. Nonetheless, many permits from the UK circulate
in the rest of Europe.9 The EU ETS is administered by DG Climate Action of the European
Commission, but monitoring of emissions and enforcement of emissions reduction is the
responsibility of the member states. More precisely, the member state in which the emissions
originate ensures that sufficient permits are held by the emitter. In the UK, this is done by the
devolved administrations: England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. These agencies
will need to continue to implement Directive 2003/87/EC and its amendments10 lest UK
companies sell all their permits before ETSexit.
When New Jersey left the U.S. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), it stopped
issuing new emission permits after 2011 but committed to uphold the validity of permits





9It is not possible to estimate how many UK permits circulate in Europe. The ETS Transaction Log, which
records sales by nationality of the current permit owner rather than the original owner, holds no data after
April 2014. In 2013, UK-registered companies sold 1.7 billion permits to companies registered elsewhere. In
2013, total UK emissions were 0.5 billion tonnes of CO2e. This highlights the importance of the UK in the EU
ETS but tells us little about UK permits circulating in the 27 EU countries.
10See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri¼CELEX:02003L0087-20140430&from¼EN.
11RGGI also recognizes New Jersey permits issued for the years 2012 to 2014, even though New Jersey does
not. This increases the emissions cap. Pizer and Yates (2015) discuss the impact of delinking on futures
markets.






/reep/article-abstract/12/1/183/4689155 by Vrije U
niversiteit Am
sterdam
 user on 22 July 2020
elegant, such a solution would require that the UK accept the jurisdiction of the ECJ until the
surrender of all UK-held permits has been completed.
The EU would need to validate all permits circulating on Brexit day and stop buying
permits from UK companies. Although this would be a de facto weakening of the emissions
cap, it would preserve the integrity of the EU ETS.
Implications of ETSexit for the UK
ETSexit would have the following implications for the UK:
Increased Compliance Costs
UK imports of emission permits equaled 44 and 59 million tonnes of CO2e in 2013 and 2014,
respectively.12 The UK aimed to reduce emissions by 232 million tonnes of CO2e per year.
13
This means that 18.9 percent and 25.4 percent of UK emission reductions in 2013 and 2014,
respectively, were achieved by net imports of permits. If the UK leaves the EU ETS, then it
would have to meet its emission reduction targets by cutting emissions within the UK.
However, against the advice of the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) concerning a
Brexit target adjustment (CCC 2016),14 the House of Commons voted to maintain the strict
emission reduction targets of the Climate Change Act of 2008.15 This means that ETSexit
would lead to a sharp, upward shock in the economic cost of emission reduction, by 40
percent or more (see Tavoni and Tol 2010). The CCC (2013) estimates that the costs of UK
climate policy in 2020 will be about 0.5 percent of GDP. This assumes policy implementation
at the lowest possible cost. However, Lilley (2016) argues that the actual cost will be about 80
percent higher. This suggests that the increase in compliance costs due to ETSexit would be
about 0.2 to 0.4 percent of GDP.
There are other costs, too. London plays a central role in financial markets, including the
carbon market. The EU seeks to move the euro clearing business from London once it loses
its single-market protections.16 Carbon markets may follow, causing a loss of business for the UK.
Transition Costs
There are also transition costs related to ETSexit. For example, in the months leading up to
ETSexit, UK companies may protest the de facto expropriation of the excess EU permits and
futures that they own or the losses they incur as they sell off their EU permits at suppressed
prices. Other companies have taken long-term hedges on the energy market, counting on the
UK being part of the ETS, or borrowed money against their stocks of permits. If the UK does





14The CCC maintains both that the UK would have been a net exporter of emission permits and that policy
implementation lags behind ambition (CCC 2016).
15See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-36673894.
16See https://www.ft.com/content/8888e560-57e5-11e7-9fed-c19e2700005f.
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the additional regulatory uncertainty due to ETSexit will likely have a negative impact on
investment in energy, a sector that already suffers from an excess of regulatory uncertainty
(Kelly and Pollitt 2010; Strachan and Dowlatabadi 2004) and a shortage of investment
(Watson and Scott 2009).
Implications Beyond the UK and EU ETS
The implications of Brexit go beyond the ETS. Many emission reduction initiatives originate
with the European Commission (CCC 2016), as does electricity sector reform. Nuclear power
and interconnection are two additional planks of UK climate policy. However, rejecting the
jurisdiction of the ECJ also implies leaving EurAtom, the EU nuclear regulator. This means
that the UK would no longer be in compliance with international regulations on trade in
nuclear material. Foreign companies would then be temporarily forbidden to build, operate,
or supply nuclear power stations in the UK, another transition cost.
Investment in interconnectors that connect national power grids is hampered by regulatory
uncertainty in the two connected markets (Pelletier and Wortmann 2009). The European
Commission has worked hard to increase predictability and transparency and to harmonize
power market regulation.17 Brexit would thus likely deter commercial investment in new inter-
connection capacity between the UK and other countries. Brexit will also end investment in the
UK energy sector by the European Commission and the European Investment Bank.
Moving Forward: Policy Options and Recommendations
This discussion of the implications of ETSexit for both the UK and the EU suggests that it
would be beneficial for the UK to remain permanently in the EU ETS. If the UK exits the EU
ETS, a major part of UK climate policy would disappear (CCC 2016). The UK is committed to
its emission reduction targets;18 indeed, the UK has always argued for more stringent targets
than the EU (Veenman and Liefferink 2012). Thus, if the UK decides in favor of ETSexit, it
should prepare for an overhaul of UK climate policy. There appear to be two main policy
options for the UK should it opt for ETSexit:
Form a UK ETS
The UK could have its own ETS, which could be modeled on and linked to the New England
(RGGI) or California programs in the United States. Alternatively, the UK could seek to
establish an ETS for the commonwealth. However, given the short timeframe for preparing
for Brexit, this does not seem feasible. It would be disruptive for UK businesses and create
distortions at the UK–EU border.
This means that any UK ETS would likely be a carbon copy of the EU ETS. The UK ETS
could be linked to the EU ETS, so that carbon prices continue to be uniform, as they should be
(Baumol and Oates 1971). Linking permit markets is feasible (Rehdanz and Tol 2005; Metcalf
and Weisbach 2012), but it requires both mutual recognition of emission permits and a
17See https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-consumers/market-legislation
18See https://www.theccc.org.uk/2016/07/20/fifth-carbon-budget-infographic/.
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conflict resolution mechanism. Switzerland has agreed, in principle, to do exactly this.19
Cross-border legal oversight lies with the Permanent Court of Arbitration, a conflict resolu-
tion option that would likely be acceptable to the UK government.
A UK Carbon Tax
Alternatively, the UK could abandon the ETS altogether in favor of its carbon tax. Indeed,
Tinbergen (1952) would have objected to current UK climate policy, which includes both a
carbon tax and a system of permit trading. Like a UK ETS, a carbon tax would continue
existing policy and therefore be neither legislatively nor administratively onerous. It would,
however, create friction at the UK–EU border as carbon prices diverge. Thus, although price
instruments are generally preferred to quantity instruments for problems such as climate
change (Weitzman 1974), tradable permits, and hence a UK ETS, may be a better option for
the UK.
Conclusions
UK climate policy is tightly integrated with the EU. The EU could avoid most of the problems
created by ETSexit if it were to follow the New Jersey precedent and recognize all pre-Brexit
permits. However, the EU would still need to renegotiate its permit allocation. The decision
by the UK to leave the EU means higher costs for its climate policy and lower chances of
meeting its emission reduction targets. Moreover, the indecision by the UK as to what it wants
instead of EU membership leaves Her Majesty’s Civil Service little time to replace EU regu-
lations with UK regulations. In order to buy time and minimize disruption to the EU ETS, the
UK could negotiate a transition period and leave the EU on January 1, 2021—or better still,
not depart the EU at all. However, if that is politically infeasible, the UK should either create a
UK ETS, closely modeled on the EU ETS, or raise its carbon levy.
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Grüll, G., and L. Taschini. 2011. Cap-and-trade
properties under different hybrid scheme designs.
Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 61(1):107–18.
Kelly, S., and M. Pollitt. 2010. An assessment of the
present and future opportunities for combined
heat and power with district heating (CHP-DH) in
the United Kingdom. Energy Policy
38(11):6936–45.
Lilley, P. 2016. £300 Billion: The Cost of the Climate
Change Act. London: Global Warming Policy
Foundation.
Metcalf, G. E., and D. Weisbach. 2012. Linking
policies when tastes differ: global climate policy in
a heterogeneous world. Review of Environmental
Economics and Policy 6(1):110–29.
Pelletier, C., and J. C. Wortmann. 2009. A risk
analysis for gas transport network planning ex-
pansion under regulatory uncertainty in Western
Europe. Energy Policy 37(2):721–32.
Pizer, W. A., and A. J. Yates. 2015. Terminating
links between emission trading programs. Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management
71:142–59.
Rehdanz, K., and R. S. J. Tol. 2005. Unilateral
regulation of bilateral trade in greenhouse gas
emission permits. Ecological Economics
54(4):397–416.
Strachan, N., and H. Dowlatabadi. 2004. Supplier
strategies and responses to institutional drivers for
an emerging energy technology. International
Journal of Global Energy Issues 21(4):383–96.
Tavoni, M., and R. S. J. Tol. 2010. Counting only
the hits? The risk of underestimating the costs of
stringent climate policy: A letter. Climatic Change
100(3):769–78.
Tinbergen, J. 1952. On the Theory of Economic
Policy. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Veenman, S., and D. Liefferink. 2012. Different
countries, different strategies: ‘Green’ member
states influencing EU climate policy. In A
Handbook of Globalisation and Environmental
Policy: National Government Interventions in a
Global Arena, 2nd ed., ed. F. Wijen, K. Zoeteman,
and J. Pieters, 387–414. Cheltenham, UK: Edward
Elgar.
Watson, J., and A. Scott. 2009. New nuclear power
in the UK: a strategy for energy security? Energy
Policy 37(12):5094–104.
Weitzman, M. L. 1974. Prices vs. quantities. Review
of Economic Studies 41(4):477–91.
World Bank. 2016. Emissions Trading in Practice: A
Handbook on Design and Implementation.
Washington, DC: World Bank.






/reep/article-abstract/12/1/183/4689155 by Vrije U
niversiteit Am
sterdam
 user on 22 July 2020
